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Republicanism and Crime 
Richard Dagger· 
What is a crime, and how does it differ from other wrongs or wrongful actions? 
To this question there seem to be two standard answers. The first is the 'simple, 
circular, and useless' answer that crime is whatever the lawmakers say it is; the 
second is that a crime is a public wrong, or a wrong involving public rather than 
civil or private law.1 Whether this second answer is itself satisfactory is a matter of 
debate, but there is no doubt that it has had a widespread and long-lasting appeal. 
Cesare Beccaria, for example, held that 'all the actions which are inimical to the 
public good ... can be called crimes'. 2 His contemporary, William Blackstone, 
divided wrongs into 'private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an 
infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, 
considered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: the 
latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole 
community, considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher 
appellation of crimes and misdemeanors'. 3 
Blackstone, Beccaria, and those who join them in defining crime as public 
wrong may give the better of the two standard answers, but it is not fully 
• Earlier drafts of this essay were presented to the Law and Republicanism Workshop of the 
IVR Congress in Krakow, Poland, in August 2007; to a colloquium at Arizona State University in 
November 2007; and to a workshop on criminal law at the University of Warwick in July 2008. 
Whatever faults remain, this essay is much the better for the spirited discussion and criticism it 
received on those occasions. I am especially grateful to the editors of this volume, to Antony Duff, 
to Sandra Marshall, and to Jeffrie Murphy for additional discussion of and written comments on 
one or more of the earlier drafts. 
1 Quoting Dressler, J., Understanding Criminal Law, 3rd edn. (New York: LexisNexis, 2001), 
l. Blacks Law Dictionary combines both answers by defining crime as 'any act done in violation of 
those duties which an individual owes to the community, and for the breach of which the law has 
provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public'. Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th edn. 
(St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990), 370. 
2 Beccaria, C., On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. R. Bellamy, and trans. 
R. Davies and V. Cox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20; see also p. 22, 'the one 
true measure of criminality is the damage done to the nation ... '; and p. 24: 'We have seen what the 
true measure of crime is, namely, harm to society'. · 
3 Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, ed. G. Sharswood (Philadelphia, 
PA: Childs & Peterson, 1860), Book III, Chapter I, p.l (emphasis in original). 
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satisfactory. For we still need to know what makes a wrong 'public' rather than 
'private'. Why is it, for instance, that murder, rape, and assault are public wrongs 
rather than simply infringements or violations of the private or civil rights of 
individuals, 'considered as individuals'? Why is breach of contract or defam-
ation of character not a public wrong subject to criminal prosecution and pun-
ishment instead of the private wrong that it is usually taken to be in common-law 
systems? 
These are but two of the difficult questions that arise when one examines 
the claim that crime is a public wrong. I take it, though, that their difficulty is 
an indication of the importance of thinking through the presuppositions and 
implications of this conception of crime, not a reason to abandon it. A thorough 
'thinking through' is too large and complex a task for this chapter, but it is pos-
sible to make a case here for the right way to proceed with such an undertak-
ing. That right way, in my view, is to look to the republican tradition of political 
thought for guidance in unravelling the problems that surround the analysis and 
practice of criminal law. In particular, I shall argue that republicanism can help 
us to understand what 'the public' is, how an action may wrong it, and why some 
of those wrongs should be designated crimes. 
I. Crime as the public's business 
In their introduction to the present volume, the editors state that the 'core values' 
of republicanism are liberty, equality, self-government, and civic virtue. I see no 
reason to disagree with them, but I think it is both simpler and historically correct 
to say that the fundamental elements of republicanism are publicity and self 
government. That is, republicans believe that government is a public concern, not 
the private business or property of some ruler or ruling class, and public concerns 
are the province of self-governing citizens who will seek to enjoy liberty under 
and through the law. 
These core commitments have been evident in republican theory since at least 
the time of Cicero's definition of the republic: 'the commonwealth [res publica] 
is the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in 
any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through 
agreement on law and community of interest'.4 According to another classical 
formulation, a republic is the empire of laws, not of men. Both definitions focus 
on the rule of law because law limits the rulers' ability to impose their will or 
whims on their subjects; when everyone is subject to the law, no one is subject 
to the arbitrary, unchecked power of another. As an empire oflaws, the republic 
protects the public interest and promotes the liberty of its citizens, who will be 
4 Cicero, M. T., On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, ed.]. Zetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 18. 
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free to govern themselves because they are free from the grip of those who would 
dominate them. 
In terms recently made familiar by Philip Pettit, the rule oflaw helps to secure 
people from both imperium and dominium.5 Security from imperium-that is, 
arbitrary power in the hands of those who control the state or government-
has been the principal concern of republican theorists through the centuries, but 
Pettit is surely right to point out the need for security also from dominium-that 
is, arbitrary power in the hands of private individuals. This double security also 
connects with the republican emphasis on the common interest or public good. 
As Mortimer Sellers says, 'Republicanism is the theory that law and government 
exist to serve the public good, including the public interest in protecting private 
interests against each other, but also against the state'.6 Protecting private interests 
against one another is thus a way of securing liberty from dominium. It is also the 
point at which crime becomes relevant to republicanism. 
To be sure, crime is not the only way in which one person may exercise arbitrary 
power over another. There is imperium, of course, and there are forms of dominium 
that may be quite lawful-the husband who browbeats his wife, for example, or 
the landowner who bends her tenants to her will. But crime is undoubtedly one 
of the most common and persistent ways in which some people wield arbitrary 
power over others. Like the unchecked ruler, the criminal interferes with our 
ability to govern our own lives. By stealing my property or robbing me of the use 
of an eye or arm, the criminal also leaves me less free to go about my life-less 
free not only because of the loss of the property, eye, or arm, but also because of 
the fear and insecurity I now feel.7 Nor do I need to be the direct victim for crime 
to make me less free by being less secure or feeling more vulnerable. The fact that 
others in my vicinity have become victims could be enough to raise my insur-
ance rates, send me to the locksmith or private protection agency, and change the 
routes I take as I go about my business. 
Crime, in short, is a threat to a republic in so far as it threatens the rule of 
law and interferes with the ability to be self-governing. It is a fitting subject for 
republican concern, then, because dealing with crime is an important part of the 
public's business. For that reason, the public should play a part in passing laws 
that define what crimes are, that provide for agencies to protect themselves from 
crime, and that establish just procedures for treating those accused of committing 
crimes, including the proper treatment for those found guilty. 
5 Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), esp. 112 and 130. 
6 Sellers, M., Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free 
State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 72; emphasis added. 
7 On this point, see Fletcher, G. P., 'Domination in Wrongdoing', Boston University Law Review, 
76 (1996), 347. But cf. Lawrence, F. M., 'Comment: The Limits of Domination', Boston University 
Law Review, 76 (1996), 361. 
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Crime is also a very real threat from the republican point of view. Republicanism 
is marked by a persistent worry about the likelihood of corruption, and corrup-
tion breeds, among other things, crime. Ambition, avarice, the desire for luxury 
and ease-these and other temptations to criminal and other kinds of vicious 
conduct may be held in check or redirected, but there is no reason to believe that 
they can be eradicated. Republicans celebrate civic virtue, of course, but they 
do so largely because they know that such virtue cannot be taken for granted. 
Putting the public good ahead of one's private interests is a virtue that repub-
licans believe most people can achieve, but they also fear that most people can 
as easily put their private interests ahead of the public good-and ahead of 
the personal interests of others. For republicans, then, finding ways to deal with 
crime is definitely part of the public's business. 
II. Toward a republican theory of criminal law 
Before republicans or anyone else can deal with crime, they must have some idea 
of what counts or should count as a crime. Many writers simply ignore or sidestep 
this question, perhaps on the assumption that everyone has a good-enough idea of 
what crime is to proceed with the business of outlining a theory of criminal law. 
It is worth the effort to try to do better than that, though, for a theory of criminal 
law that tells us what a crime is surely will be superior to one that does not. 
As I noted at the outset, most of those who wrestle with the definition of crime 
seem to conclude, like Blackstone, that it is a 'public wrong'. Carleton Allen's 
statement of this position is worth quoting at length: 
Crime is crime because it consists in wrongdoing which directly and in a serious degree 
threatens the security or well-being of society, and because it is not safe to leave it redress-
able only by compensation of the party injured. Wronged individuals are sometimes 
timid, sometimes supine, sometimes lazy, sometimes unable for one cause or another 
to pursue their remedy; the suppression of injurious wrongdoing must not be left to the 
mercy of such accidents, but must be controlled by some public authority more powerful 
and less erratic than the private plaintiff. Besides, there are a great many kinds of actions 
which do not injure any specific person at all, or at all events injure all persons equally, 
and for these there are no private remedies, for the excellent reason that they are not 
private wrongs.8 
This is probably as clear and eloquent a statement of the view that crimes 
are public wrongs as one can find. Even so, not everyone finds it convincing. 
According to Glanville Williams, Allen's attempt to provide a 'material' defin-
ition of crime that rests on the distinction between public and private wrongs 
fails. The problem is 'the overlap between a crime and a tort. Since the same 
8 Allen, C. K., 'The Nature of Crime', in Allen, C. K., Legal Duties and Other Essays in 
jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 234. 
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act can be both a crime and a tort, as in murder and assault, it is impossible to 
divide the two branches of the law by reference to the type of act'.9 Those who 
look for a way to distinguish crimes from torts typically resort to one or both of 
two claims: either crimes differ from torts in being moral wrongs, or they differ 
in 'the aspect of damage to the public'.10 But neither claim is sound, Williams 
says, for 'torts and breaches of trust may be, and often are, gross moral wrongs', 
while some crimes are not obviously immoral at all.11 Nor is it true that crimes 
always damage or harm the public: 'Some crimes are punished as an affront to 
the moral feelings of the community although they cause no damage to the 
community as a whole'.12 Moreover, 'the distinction between the community 
and the individual is not sufficiently clear-cut to explain the use of the legal term 
[i.e., "crime" or "tort"]. Between society as an aggregate of individuals at one 
end of the scale and a single individual at the other there are various intermedi-
ate groups ... There is no line clear enough to make a definition in these terms 
express the sharpness of the legal concept of crime'.13 In short, the best we can 
do is to define crime in formal or procedural terms, not as a public wrong, but 
as 'an act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings having a criminal 
outcome, and a proceeding or its outcome is criminal if it has certain character-
istics which mark it as criminal'-especially the characteristic of the offender's 
liability to punishment.14 
Williams' objections are well grounded in his knowledge of English law, but 
they are not powerful enough, in my view, to lead us to reject the definition of 
crime as public wrong. The fact that murder, assault, and other wrongs can be both 
crimes and torts attests to the overlap between the two categories, as Williams 
says, but that is not a reason to abandon the belief that crimes are public and torts 
private wrongs. On the contrary, the overlap exists because some wrongs have 
both a public and a private aspect, which is why prosecuting someone for com-
mitting a public offence leaves open the possibility that his or her victims may 
also seek damages in a civil suit. Nor should we be persuaded by Williams' claim 
that formal or procedural considerations give us all we need to distinguish crimes 
from torts. It is true that the burden of proof is more stringent in criminal cases 
than in civil, just as it is true that the offender is liable to punishment in criminal 
but not in civil cases.15 But we still need to know which cases should be subjected 
to the stricter burden of proof and which should involve the possibility of pun-
ishment, with the public condemnation of the wrongdoer it connotes. In such 
cases we will need something like the rule, 'crimes are public wrongs and torts are 
private wrongs', to help us make these determinations. Nor has Williams given 
us any reason to believe that some other rule, such as the severity or seriousness of 
9 Williams, G., 'The Definirion of Crime', Current Legal Problems, 8 (1955), 116. 
10 ibid, 117. 11 ibid, 117-18. 12 ibid, 121. 13 ibid. 14 ibid, 130. 
15 The distinction here is doubly complicared, however; someone convicted of a crime may be 
ordered to make resriturion to the vicrims, and someone found guilty of a rort may be ordered ro 
pay 'punirive' damages. 
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the offence, will do a better job than this one. I conclude, then, that a definition is 
unsatisfactory when it says, in effect, that a crime is a crime if it is one of those acts 
that we treat as crimes. We will do better to continue to regard crimes as public 
wrongs. 
This conclusion is provisional, of course, but it warrants the claim that an 
adequate theory of the criminal law will rest on-and elucidate-the belief that 
crimes are in some sense public wrongs. To borrow a distinction from Antony 
Duff, an adequate theory of criminal law will also be analytically sound and 
normatively helpful. 16 That is, theories of criminal law come in two varieties, 
the analytical and the normative. Analytical theories 'seek to explain the concept 
of criminal law, and related concepts such as-most obviously-that of crime', 
while normative theories 'seek an account not just of what criminal law is, but of 
what it ought to be (and whether it ought to be at all)'. Because normative theories 
presuppose 'some analytical account' of the 'goals, values, scope and structure' of 
the criminal law, they are more inclusive than analytical theories. A republican 
theory of criminal law must be a normative or inclusive theory of this kind, for 
republicans cannot be content with an analytical account of the criminal law 
as it is. On the republican view, the rule of law forms a large part of the pub-
lic business-of the way in which a self-governing people governs itself Such 
a people will need to concern itself not only with what the law is and how it 
operates, but also with the question of what the law ought to be or say on this or 
that matter. An adequate republican theory of criminal law therefore will be a 
normative theory. 
Such a theory will help, analytically, to make sense of the ordinary operations 
and distinctions of the criminal law. For present purposes, that means that it will 
have to account for the distinction between crimes and torts and, within criminal 
law, for the distinction between crimes that are mala in se and mala prohibita; how 
is it, in other words, that both kinds of crimes are public wrongs when the former 
have individual victims and the latter do not? We should also want a theory that 
makes sense of the distinction between crimes and administrative wrongs-that 
is, violations of administrative regulations, such as health and safety standards 
for restaurants. How is it that a violation of an administrative regulation is a 
wrong subject to a penalty rather than a crime subject to punishment?17 We may 
decide, of course, that these and other well-established distinctions should be 
abandoned, as a powerful theory of criminal law may demonstrate that they do 
more to confuse than to clarify legal relationships. We should begin, however, 
16 Duff, R. A., 'Theories of Criminal Law', Stanford EncycltJpedia of Philosophy, {<http://plato. 
stanford.edu>; posted 14 October 2002), §I. All quotations in this paragraph are from §I of this 
essay. 
17 For the distinction between penalties and punishments, with their 'condemnatory meanings', 
see Duff, R. A., Answering for Crime: Respomibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Portland, 
OR: Hart Publishing, 2007), 88. For calling my attention to the importance of administrative 
wrongs, I am grateful to Samantha Besson. 
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with the assumption that such distinctions have become well-established because 
they have proven their value over the years. 
That assumption does not preclude us from holding that an adequate theory 
must also provide normative guidance by pointing us toward ways of settling 
some of the controversies that surround the criminal law and its boundaries. We 
should not expect too much in this regard-we should not insist, for example, 
that a theory must take a compelling and definitive stand on inchoate crimes, 
so-called victimless crimes, strict liability, crimes of offence (such as flag 
burning), and every other controversy involving criminal law-but we should 
expect a theory to provide some guidance when we ask what the law should say 
about matters such as these. Whether a republican theory of criminal law can 
meet these standards-analytical and normative-is the question to which I 
now turn. 
III. Three republican approaches to criminal law 
Neo-republicans are not in perfect agreement on all matters, and we should not 
expect them to speak with one voice where the criminal law is concerned. Such an 
expectation could only be disappointed, in fact, by a reading of the three repub-
lican approaches to criminal law advanced in recent years. Two of these explicitly 
advertise themselves as 'republican' theories, while the third links itself only in 
passing with 'civic republicanism'.18 All have some claim to the title, however, 
and we cannot simply assume that only one of them can be a genuinely repub-
lican theory of the criminal law. Indeed, I will suggest that the three approaches, 
different as they are from one another, provide the bases for a more adequate 
theory than any of them supplies on its own. But first it is necessary to examine 
these three approaches. 
1. First approach: crime as a threat to dominion 
The first approach is found in the republican writings of Philip Pettit, especially 
in his book with John Braithwaite, Not Just Deserts.19 Pettit is well known for 
identifying and defending in his book Republicanism what he believes to be a 
distinctively republican conception of liberty, freedom as non-domination; 
moreover, he takes freedom so conceived to be the 'supreme political value' of the 
18 Marshall, S. E. and Duff, R. A., 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs', Canadian journal of 
Law and jurisprudence, 11 (I 998), 7 at 21. 
19 Braithwaite, ]., and Pettit, P., Not just Deserts: A Republican 7heory of Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). See also: Pettit, P. and Braithwaite, J., 'Not Just Deserts: Not 
Even in Sentencing', Current Issues in Criminal]ustice, 4 (1992-93), 225; Pettit; P. and Braithwaite, 
]., 'The Three Rs of Republican Sentencing', Current Issues in Criminal justice, 5 (1993-94), 318; 
and Pettit, P., 'Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment', Utilitas, 9 (1997), 59. 
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republican tradition.20 In Not just Deserts, however, published seven years earl-
ier, the term Braithwaite and Pettit give to the republican conception ofliberty is 
dominion. 
According to Braithwaite and Pettit, dominion is a form of negative liberty.21 
As such, it 'involves, roughly, the absence of interference by others .. .', and it is 
to be distinguished from autonomy and other forms of positive liberty, which 
involve something more than the mere absence of interference-something such 
as 'the absence of physical inability, psychological incapacity, personal ignorance, 
or something of that kind .. .'.22 Unlike other forms of negative liberty, however, 
dominion is a specifically republican conception of liberty, which means that it 
is not so much a matter of being left alone as it is 'the condition of citizenship 
in a free society, a condition under which each is properly safeguarded by the 
law against the predations of others'.23 To enjoy dominion is therefore to enjoy a 
standing or status-that of the citizen-that depends upon the rule of law and 
the recognition of others; for 'the bearer of dominion has control in a certain area, 
being free from the interference of others, but has that control in virtue of the 
recognition of others and the protection of the law'.24 
Dominion (or non-domination) is a concept with implications extending well 
beyond the criminal law. Crime, however, will be a major concern of anyone who 
wishes to promote or maximize dominion, as Braithwaite and Pettit do. On their 
account, crime constitutes an 'invasion of dominion' in the form of an assault 
on one's 'person' (as in murder or rape), 'province' (as in kidnap or harassment), 
or 'property' (as in burglary or theft).25 Republicans must therefore aim to pre-
vent crime, and to punish those who commit it, in order to promote dominion. 
A republican theory of criminal justice thus must be a consequentialist (but not 
utilitarian) theory. It must also be a comprehensive theory-'a serious attempt at a 
general normative theory of criminal justice'26-rather than a theory that speaks 
only to problems of punishment, or sentencing, or law enforcement, or any one 
or two of the many considerations involved in the criminal law. One especially 
important feature of this comprehensive theory is that it calls for reintegration 
into the community, and reintegration not only of offenders but also of victims, 
whose sense of violation may leave them estranged from the public.27 
To assess Pettit's (and Braithwaite's) theory, we must begin by asking whether 
it is truly republican. The answer is yes, I think, even if we balk at his claim that 
freedom as non-domination is the 'supreme political value' of republicanism. 
There is much debate as to the adequacy and distinctiveness of Pettit's 'repub-
lican' conception of freedom, but little doubt that he has revived an important 
20 Pettit, Republicanism (above, n. 5), 80. 
21 In this and the following paragraph I draw on my 'Republican Punishment: Consequentialist 
or Retributivist?', in Laborde, C. and Maynor, J. (eds.), Republicanism and Political 1heory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2008), 219. 
22 Braithwaite and Pettit, Not just Deserts (above, n. 19), 55. 23 ibid, 57. 
24 ibid, 60. 25 ibid, 69. 26 ibid, 24. 27 ibid, 91-2. 
Republicanism and Crime 155 
aspect of republicanism. Any theory of criminal law that takes dominion or non-
domination as its central concept should therefore be considered a republican 
theory, if not the one and only republican theory. 
But what of the idea that crime is public wrong? On this point Pettit's theory 
is difficult to assess, because he (and Braithwaite) off er no definition of crime, 
let alone a distinction between crime and tort or mala in se and mala prohibita 
crimes. On the one hand, the emphasis on dominion suggests that crime, as an 
'invasion of dominion', constitutes a public wrong. As Braithwaite and Pettit say 
in the Preface to their book, 'Dominion amounts to freedom in the social sense of 
full citizenship ... '.28 To invade someone's dominion is thus to attack her status 
as a citizen-as a public person-and therefore to commit a public wrong. On 
the other hand, other kinds of wrongs may also interfere with or decrease one's 
dominion. Libel and slander may threaten or damage my 'province', for example, 
just as kidnap and harassment do, and the neighbour who accidentally breaks my 
window may do more damage to my property than the vandal who maliciously 
throws rocks at my house. Libel, slander, and accidents, however, typically fall 
into the category of torts, not crimes, and it is not obvious that an appeal to 
dominion can help us to distinguish the two kinds of wrongs. Indeed, if there 
is reason to believe that we can better maximize dominion by treating what we 
now call crimes as torts, then Pettit's (and Braithwaite's) theory could prove to 
be a theory of criminal justice that advocates the abolition of crime as a legal 
category. 
There is another respect, though, in which Not just Deserts offers more guidance 
with regard to the idea of crime as public wrong. In addition to offences against 
person, property, and province, Braithwaite and Pettit also follow Joel Feinberg 
in recognizing a category of 'derivative crimes'-that is, 'crimes which are not 
threats to dominion as such but which endanger the system whereby dominion 
is protected', such as escape from prison, tax evasion, and practising medicine 
without a licence.29 These crimes that 'endanger the system whereby dominion is 
protected' are clearly public wrongs-direct public wrongs, perhaps, in contrast 
to the indirect public wrong that is done when an offender invades an individual's 
dominion.30 In this way Braithwaite and Pettit could account for public wrongs 
in their theory while also making sense of the distinction between ma/a in se and 
mala prohibita by putting 'invasions of dominion' into the former category and 
'derivative crimes' into the latter. 
Finally, with regard to normative guidance, Braithwaite and Pettit's theory does 
well, at least in that it addresses a number of controversial issues in criminal law. 
Taking dominion as their touchstone, they hold that victimless (or 'consensual') 
crimes should be made legal, although the activities in question should in some 
28 ibid, vii; emphasis added. 29 ibid, 94. 
30 lhe escapee and the unlicensed practitioner could threaten the person oi province of specific 
individuals, of course, but they need not do so. TI1e escapee could lead a peaceful life while out of 
prison, and the person practising medicine could be a competent, if unlicensed, physician. 
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cases, such as heroin use, be closely regulated;31 that strict liability is justified 
'where the threats to dominion are sufficiently profound';32 and that crimes of 
offence, such as blasphemy and flag burning, are unjustifiable threats to religious 
and political freedom, respectively (but note their more complex position with 
regard to public indecency).33 Other republicans may reach different conclusions 
on one or more of these controversies-a republican case for protecting flags and 
other symbols of the public, for example-but Braithwaite and Pettit at least 
address, in plausible fashion, these controversial topics. 
2. Second approach: republican virtue and criminal vice 
To see that self-proclaimed republicans do not speak with one voice, 
we need only look to the 'republican theory of inculpation premised on 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics' that Kyron Huigens advances in 'Virtue and 
Inculpation'.34 As the title indicates, Huigens is concerned with what it is that 
inculpates an offender, or justifies the 'punishing majority' in holding him or 
her culpable.35 The title also indicates that the central concept is not dominion 
or non-domination, but virtue.36 'The law has a purpose, an end in view', he 
writes, 'which is to promote the greater good of humanity. ?he criminal law 
serves that end by promoting virtue; that is, by inquiring into the quality of 
practical judgment displayed by the accused in his actions'.37 
For Huigens, inculpation is 'an act of communal interpretation that we engage 
in as we construct a good life'.38 In judging a member of the community accused 
of an offence, 'we are concerned not only with the effects of her actions, but also 
with her decisions. We care about the quality of the accused's practical judgment, 
for it is by means of that faculty that the accused participates with us in the 
conduct and construction of our shared political life'.39 When a jury sits in judg-
ment, the judgment it reaches 'is not about the actions of the accused, but about 
the right course of action in the circumstances of the accused'.40 In other words, 
juries do not simply judge whether the accused did or did not commit the offence 
with which he or she is charged. What they really have to decide is whether the 
accused did what is right or reasonable in the circumstances. Faced, for example, 
with a car left unlocked and the key in the ignition, did the accused properly exer-
cise practical reason when deciding to drive away with the car? If the answer is no, 
then the conclusion is that the accused lacks the virtue of practical reason-the 
31 Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts (above, n. 19), 97-9. 
32 ibid, 100. 33 ibid, 95-7. 
34 Huigens, K., 'Virtue and lnculpation', Harvard Law Review, 108 (1995), 1423 at 1425. 
35 ibid, 1425 and 1467. 
36 Huigens mentions neither Braithwaite's and Pettit's book nor any of Pettit's writings on the 
concept of freedom cited in this chapter. 
37 Huigens, 'Virtue and lnculpation' (above, n. 34), 1425; emphasis added. 
38 ibid, 1445. 39 ibid, emphasis in original. 40 ibid, 1463. 
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virtue that enables a person to participate 'in the conduct and construction of our 
shared political life'.41 
How should we assess this virtue-based approach to criminal law? In this case 
I think we need to question both its credentials as a republican theory and its 
adequacy as a theory of criminal law. That is, we may concede that virtue has 
a role to play in the criminal law and in republicanism without thinking that 
it plays the central role that Huigens gives it. There is also reason to doubt that 
his virtue-centred approach meets the standard appropriate to analytical theor-
ies of the criminal law-namely, that they make sense of and elucidate ordinary 
features of that law. We have already seen, for example, that Huigens maintains 
that a jury's judgment 'is not about the actions of the accused, but about the right 
course of action in the circumstances of the accused'.42 But surely the jury does 
have to pass judgment on the actions of the accused-on whether he did indeed 
do what he is accused of doing. There may be circumstances in which jurors 
should take other considerations into account, but one thing we should always 
want them to consider is 'the actions of the accused'. We may also worry about 
Huigens' view of the reasons for punishment. The criminals' offence, he says, 'is, 
in the final analysis, a failure of practical judgment; they have failed to assemble 
and pursue an appropriate scheme of ends premised on an adequate conception of 
the good. We blame and punish them for that failure'.43 That failure may be blame-
worthy, but is it enough by itself to warrant punishment? If so, we apparently are 
warranted in punishing anyone who fails to 'assemble and pursue an appropriate 
scheme of ends premised on an adequate conception of the good', including those 
persons whose poor judgment may never lead them to break the law.44 
What of the adequacy of Huigens' approach as a republican theory? Virtue is 
certainly an important concept in the republican tradition, and one can fault 
Pettit and Braithwaite for giving it too little weight in their neo-republican 
theory. Huigens goes to the other extreme, however, in making virtue the sum 
and substance of republicanism. Indeed, it seems fair to say that what he is really 
offering is an Aristotelian virtue theory of criminal law, with 'republican' being 
little more than a label-a label that Huigens has since discarded in favour of 
'aretaic'.45 He does, of course, make a case for taking the promotion of virtue to 
be the public's business, but he has nothing to say about civic virtue as such. His 
41 ibid, 1445. 42 ibid, 1458; emphasis added. 43 ibid, emphasis added. 
44 In a subsequent essay Huigens responds to a similar criticism from R. A. Duff by saying, 
'it was at least clear [in "Virtue and Inculpation"] that I did not mean to use harm and criminal 
wrongdoing only as evidence of poor judgment or bad character'. Huigens, K., 'On Aristotelian 
Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, Notre Dame journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, 18 (2004), 465 
at483. 
45 See ibid, p. 496: 'In ["Virtue and Inculpation"] ... I tied the theory of punishment to a larger 
political theory, classical republicanism, that can fairly be described as illiberal ... I dropped this 
argument some time ago, and ... a republican political theory is not a necessary feature of the 
aretaic theory of punishment'. 
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theory bears traces of republicanism, in short, but they are not sufficient to make 
it a truly republican theory of criminal law. 
There is no doubt, though, that Huigens puts forward a strong case for 
regarding crime as a public wrong. Virtue is important because it contributes to 
the public good, and crime is bad because it detracts from and even threatens the 
public good. The problem is that his case may be too strong. If crime is a public 
wrong, and if crime is, 'in the final analysis, a failure of practical judgment', then 
many of the things we ordinarily take to be torts or even personal offences-
breaking promises, engaging in gossip, insulting someone-may become crimes. 
There also seems to be no basis for distinguishing ma/a in se offences from those 
that are ma/a prohibita. 
Huigens's virtue-based approach does offer some normative guidance, finally, 
with regard to controversial matters in criminal law. In fact, he argues that the 
'leading rationale for punishing inchoate offenses is customarily stated in terms 
of virtue ethics', for this rationale is based on the actor's 'dangerous disposition', 
not on the criminal act she attempted but failed to complete.46 He also distin-
guishes criminal negligence from strict liability, arguing 'that criminal negligence 
is genuinely inculpatory and not merely a form of strict liability'.47 Whether this 
means that strict-liability offences should not be considered crimes or merely that 
the offender should not be counted culpable in the mens rea sense is not clear. 
3. Third approach: crime as shared wrongs 
Sandra Marshall and Antony Duff develop the third of the recent republican 
approaches to the criminal law in their essay, 'Criminalization and Sharing 
Wrongs'.48 They do not align themselves with republicanism until late in their 
essay, however, when they say: 
Any account of the concept of crime and of the proper scope and aims of the criminal law 
must, we assume, be informed by a political theory ... The political theory ro which we 
would appeal, and on which the idea of community involved in our argument depends, is 
some version of the 'civic republicanism' sketched by Charles Taylor.49 
They also draw a connection to Braithwaite and Pettit on dominion when 
they argue that 'proscribing and punishing attacks on individual Rechtsguter 
[i.e., significant legally protected interests] ... serves at the same time to assure 
all citizens that such wrongs against them will not go unpunished, and thus to 
foster collective security ... '.5° For the most part, however, they seem as happy 
46 Huigens, 'Virrue and lnculpacion' (above, n. 34), 1477. 47 ibid, 1472. 
48 Marshall and Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (above, n. 18). 
49 ibid, 21. 1heir reference is to Taylor, C., 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate', in Rosenblum, N. (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 170. 
50 ibid, 9; referring in a note to chaps. 4 and 5 of Not just Deserts (above, n. 19). 
Republicanism and Crime 159 
to think of their position as communitarian, or as an amalgam ofliberalism and 
communitarianism, as republican.51 Clearly they are less concerned with the 
tradition to which their ideas belong than with making sense of the idea that 
crime is a public wrong. 
To make their case, Marshall and Duff focus on the 'paradigmatic crimes', 
such as murder, rape, and theft, which 'tend to be crimes that directly victimize 
individuals'.52 They recognize that other crimes pose more direct threats to the 
public or collective good-they refer, for example, to such crimes of 'abstract 
endangerment' as drunken driving or those involving toxic materials-but they 
take the challenge to be that of demonstrating how crimes with specific individual 
victims can and should be regarded as public wrongs. 
According to Marshall and Duff, crime involves 'socially proscribed 
wrongdoing'.53 Some of these socially proscribed actions will be the otherwise 
innocent actions that are made wrong by their prohibition, such as driving 
without a licence. But others will be mala in se, and the members of the society 
have a responsibility to proscribe these inherently wrong actions: 'to believe that 
a certain kind of conduct should be criminal is to believe, at least, that it is con-
duct which should be declared wrong by the community: that it is a matter on 
which the community should take a shared and public view, and claim normative 
authority over its members'.54 Crime is thus the public's business, and it remains 
the public's business even when it is committed in private: 'the community claims 
the right, for instance, to declare that spouse-beating is wrong'.55 
The next step in the argument is to show how the members of a group can 
'share' a wrong. Here Marshall and Duff rely on the example of a group of women 
responding to a sexual attack on a member of the group. The women in the 
group: 
... may see it as a collective, not merely an individual, wrong ... insofar as they associ-
ate and identify themselves with the individual victim. For they define themselves as a 
group, in terms of a certain shared identity, shared values, mutual concerns-and shared 
dangers which threaten them: an attack on a member of the group is thus an attack on the 
group-on their shared values and their common good. 1he wrong does not cease ro be 
'her' wrong: but it is also 'our' wrong insofar as we identify ourselves with her.56 
Nor is there any reason to believe that this sense of group membership cannot 
extend to the political society; and if it can, then the members of that society can 
'share' in wrongs against individual members. 
[S]uppose ... that citizens see (or should see) each other as bound rogether in a way analo-
gous ro the way in which members of the women's group ... see each other as bound 
together (even if those bonds may be somewhat less intimate). We can then also see how 
51 Elsewhere Duff advocates 'a republican liberal rnmmunirarianism': Answering far Crime 
(above, n. 17), 50, n. 36. 
52 Marshall and Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (above, n. 18), 8. 
53 ibid, 13; emphasis added. 54 ibid. 55 ibid, 14. 56 ibid, 19-20. 
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wrongs against individual citizens can be understood as shared wrongs, as wrongs against 
the whole community, insofar as the individual goods which are attacked are goods in 
terms of which the community identifies and understands itself.57 
In this way Marshall and Duff claim to show how the paradigmatic crimes can 
be understood both as crimes against individuals and as shared or public wrongs. 
The wrong done to a rape victim 'is not "our" wrong instead of hers; it is "our" 
wrong because it is a wrong done to her, as one of us-as a fellow member of our 
community whose identity and whose good is found within that community'.58 
Is this account of crime adequate? It will not seem so to anyone who believes 
that all crimes are offences against individuals, full stop, or that there is no such 
thing as society, as Margaret Thatcher once declared. It should have a strong 
appeal to republicans, however. There is, after all, a Ciceronian flavour to much 
of what Marshall and Duff say, as in the following passage: 
A group can ... 'share' the wrongs done to its individual members, insofar as it defines 
and identifies itself as a community united by mutual concern, by genuinely shared (as 
distinct from contingently coincident) values and interests, and by the shared recogni-
tion that its members' goods (and their identity) are bound up with their membership 
of the community. Wrongs done to individual members of the community are then 
wrongs against the whole community-injuries to a common or shared, not merely to an 
individual, good.59 
To be sure, a republican may complain that Marshall and Duff rely too heavily 
on the sense ofidentity or membership in a community, thus opening themselves 
to an objection often raised against communitarians-namely, that some com-
munities foster a commitment to narrow-minded, intolerant, and even wicked 
values and interests. There is also another problem betrayed by one of the passages 
quoted above. '[S]uppose', they say, 'that citizens see (or should see) each other as 
bound together ... .'60 As the parenthetical 'or should see' indicates, the sense of 
membership or identity may be missing when it should be present; citizens may 
share values and interests that they fail to perceive as shared, perhaps because of 
the size and diversity of their polity. For these reasons, republicans prefer to talk 
of the importance of the rule of law as a binding force among citizens, not the 
sense of community or identity as such. 
Setting those problems aside for the moment, the account that Marshall and 
Duff give of crime as public or shared wrongs seems to me the most promis-
ing of the three recent republican approaches to criminal law. It accounts for 
ma/a in se and ma/a prohibita as distinctive kinds of public wrongs, and it also 
offers the neatest way of preserving the distinction between civil and criminal 
law. This it can do through the conception of crime as socially proscribed wrong-
doing, which allows them to distinguish wrongs that should be authoritatively 
proscribed from those that society leaves to individuals to address as private 
57 ibid, 20. 58 ibid, 21. 59 ibid, 20; emphasis added. 60 ibid. 
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matters. For Braithwaite and Pettit, the appeal to dominion blurs the crime and 
tort distinction in one way, by opening the possibility that dominion might bet-
ter be protected by collapsing crimes into torts; for Huigens, the appeal to virtue 
blurs the distinction by moving in the other direction. For Marshall and Duff, 
however, the distinction does not rest on a single concept or value, but on the 
judgment of the public as to what should be a private and what a fully public 
matter. 'We must ask, in part, what kinds of wrongs should be seen as wrongs 
against "us"; and this is to ask which values are (which should be) so central to a 
community's identity and self-understanding, to its conception of its members' 
good, that actions which attack or flout those values are not merely individual 
matters which the individual victim should pursue for herself, but attacks on the 
community.'61 If this falls short of a definitive answer to the question of where the 
line between criminal and civil law should be drawn, it is a shortfall that repub-
licans can appreciate, for it leaves to self-governing citizens the task of reaching 
a public decision concerning where this line between public and private wrongs 
should be drawn. 
From the republican standpoint, then, Marshall and Duff off er the most 
promising of the three neo-republican approaches to criminal law. The prom-
ise, however, is not fully realized. There are two problems that stand in the way, 
beginning with one already noted. When they appeal to the sense of commu-
nity and its shared values as a way of distinguishing public from private wrongs, 
Marshall and Duff rely on communitarian considerations that are doubly 
troublesome. On the one hand, these considerations are not necessarily congenial 
to republicanism. The values that the members of a community share do not 
have to be republican values, and they may even be hostile to them. On the other 
hand, the values prevailing in some communities may make crimes of activ-
ities that Marshall and Duff presumably believe should be legal-crimes such 
as helping someone to escape slavery, for example, or challenging the official 
religion. If they are to avoid such unpalatable possibilities, they will have to take 
the apparently ad hoc step of specifying the kind or kinds of communities whose 
shared sense of public wrong does or should count when activities are deemed to 
be criminal. 1he idea of'the public' does no real work here, then. It all depends 
on what the values of the community are, and on what kind(s) of community we 
are willing to countenance.62 
The second problem relates to their focus on murder, rape, and theft as 
'paradigmatic crimes'. These crimes are surely paradigmatic in the sense that they 
are the kinds of wrongs that come quickly to mind when most people think about 
61 ibid, 21-2; emphasis added. 
62 To be fair, Marshall and Duff seem to assume a two-stage theory, in which first one makes a 
communitarian case for conceiving of crime as a shared public wrong and then, at the second stage, 
makes a case for a political theory that provides the best account of how the public or community 
ought robe conceived. I do not think that the stages can be so neatly separated; but even if they can, 
Marshall and Duff still must supply stage two of the theory. 
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crime. As Marshall and Duff recognize, though, these crimes are not obviously 
public wrongs. If we were to draw up a list of 'paradigmatic public wrongs', I sus-
pect that treason, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice would be more likely 
to appear than murder, rape, and theft. After all, we can easily conceive of the 
latter set of offences as private wrongs, but not the former. We can even think of 
defamation of character, typically classified as a tort in common-law systems, as 
an offence that is more truly public than those acts of violence that Marshall and 
Duff label 'paradigmatic crimes'.63 Jones can murder, rape, or steal from Smith 
without anyone else ever becoming aware of the offence; but if Jones is to libel 
or slander Smith, other people must hear (of) or read (of) what Jones has to say. 
When there is no publicity, there is no defamation, no matter how much Smith 
may be hurt by what Jones says in their private conversation. Why, then, isn't 
defamation a public wrong, and hence a crime, and perhaps even a 'paradigmatic 
crime'? 
One could argue, of course, that defamation should be a crime rather than a 
tort, and perhaps a republican theory of criminal law, in its normative aspect, will 
point us to that conclusion. But if we want such a theory, in its analytical dimen-
sion, to make sense of well-established legal categories and distinctions, then we 
should first see what may be said for regarding defamation as a private wrong and 
murder, rape, and theft as public wrongs. There are good reasons, in my view, to 
hold to these standard classifications, but these reasons require us to rely more 
heavily and explicitly on republicanism than Marshall and Duff do. So, at least, I 
shall now try to show. 
IV. Private, public, and republic 
There is a sense in which all wrongs are public, including those that have no 
legal remedy (such as callously hurting someone's feelings). All are public, that 
is, in the sense that public definition of some sort determines whether a wrong 
is a matter of criminal law, civil law, or none of the law's business. In this sense, 
defamation and murder both are public (or publicly defined) wrongs. Moreover, 
both are wrongs for which the public provides avenues of remedy; for the judges 
and juries who hear civil cases are agents of the public as fully as are those who 
hear criminal ones. There is a paradox here, however, in that distinguishing public 
from private wrongs and handling them differently under the law appear to be of 
value to the public. It seems to be in the public interest, in other words, to place 
murder in the public-wrong category and defamation in the private. How can 
that be, and how can republicanism help us to understand how it can be? 
Defamation is a wrong, as I have noted, with an inescapably public dimension. 
Why, then, should we want to place it on the private-law side of a legal system? 
63 I owe this point to Jeffrie Murphy. 
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Perhaps, in the end, we should not. Yet there is a republican case for keeping def-
amation in the tort category that would unfold in something like the following 
fashion. Defamation, republicans can say, is undoubtedly of great concern to the 
individual who is, or believes that she is, slandered or libelled. In many cases a 
clear harm to the victim results from the defamation; and in others the victim 
is wronged by the slander or libel even if it produces no clearly harmful results. 
But defamation is also a public wrong, both in the sense already discussed-
that we cannot privately defame someone-and in the sense that it can have ser-
ious public repercussions. Defamation may lead people to withdraw their trust, 
for example, from someone whose services could prove highly valuable to them. 
Defamation may also wrong someone not only as an individual but as a citizen-
that is, in her public capacity. By casting doubt on the character of citizens, more-
over, defamation can contribute to an attitude of cynicism and civic distrust, 
thereby lowering the quality of public or civic life. Clearly, the public has a reason 
to see to it that slander and libel are discouraged. But this can better be done 
through civil than criminal law. 
This is so, republicans can say, because it is better to leave these matters to 
the supposedly aggrieved individual to pursue. In the case of defamation, that 
pursuit will take the form of a civil suit. In the case of other torts, we may even 
prefer that individuals settle matters between themselves, in neighbourly fash-
ion, rather than take their dispute to court. Republicans are committed to the 
rule oflaw, but that does not mean that they will think the good citizen is some-
one who appeals to the law at every provocation. In the case of defamation, 
republicans can hold that the initiative for defending his or her reputation should 
be left to the individual, not placed in the hands of a public prosecutor. Taking 
responsibility for one's reputation is a public or civic virtue, in other words, but 
it is a virtue that the individual must exercise at his or her discretion, and it 
must be balanced against other considerations. If the individual believes that 
the (perceived) libel or slander is of no great moment, or that pursuing a legal 
remedy would distract her from more important matters, then she should be free 
to make that decision, in keeping with the republican ideal of self-government. 
But if she takes the (perceived) libel or slander to be worth pursuing in court, 
then she must be the one who takes the initiative. Granting some public offi-
cial the authority to uncover and prosecute cases of defamation is also likely to 
dampen free and open public discussion, which is not an outcome republicans 
will welcome. Defamation may be a matter of public concern, in short, but it is a 
matter best left to civil law. 
This conclusion may seem to be not only too quick but also unfair to those 
who have been defamed.64 Pursuing a civil suit is a time- and money-consuming 
matter that surely discourages many victims of libel and slander from seeking 
vindication in a civil trial. How, then, can republicans hold that defamation 
64 As Jeffrie Murphy has forcefully reminded me. 
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should remain a tort rather than become a crime? There are, I think, three 
responses available to republicans. The first is to appeal once again to the damp-
ening effect on freedom of speech that opening defamation to public prosecution 
is likely to have. The second is to note that those who are sued for defamation 
may well find that defending themselves is as time- and money-consuming as 
bringing the suit is for those who think themselves defamed. There are burdens 
to be borne on both sides of a suit, and it is not obvious that we can best promote 
justice or fairness by making it less costly to bring charges of defamation. Finally, 
the third response is to grant the force of the objection while looking for another 
remedy. If, that is, republicans believe that individuals should not be discouraged 
by lack of time, money, or other resources from pursuing defamation cases, they 
can look for ways to provide these individuals with public support-perhaps in 
the form of publicly funded legal aid-so that they can pursue their cases in civil 
courts. 
Conclusive or not, these arguments indicate how republicans can make the 
case for counting an offence so difficult to categorize as defamation as a tort. But 
what about murder and the other 'paradigmatic crimes'? These are, at first glance, 
crimes against persons rather than against citizens. They can even be committed, 
as we have seen, in private, and kept from the public view, in ways that defam-
ation cannot. Yet there is a public dimension to such offences as murder that 
ultimately makes it proper to treat them as public wrongs. Murder is certainly 
an offence against a person, but it is an offence that also threatens the public, or 
republic, in at least two ways. One is that being a person is a necessary condition 
for being a citizen. Murder and other serious violations of our persons must be 
treated, therefore, as public offences-as attacks on citizenship. Second, these 
offences threaten the public through their spillover effects. As noted earlier, one 
need not be the direct victim of an assault to feel its injurious effects, such as fear, 
insecurity, and the loss of trust in those who are supposedly one's fellow citizens. 
Because they typically 'spill over' in these ways, the 'paradigmatic crimes' are 
clearly public wrongs. 
They are the kind of wrongs, furthermore, that we have good reason to expect 
the public authorities to prosecute. We may worry about the dampening effects 
on free and open discussion of a public search for defamation, but we will not 
complain if the public attempt to find and punish murderers has a dampening 
effect on murder. Nor will we think it fitting that the victim of rape, theft, or 
assault must bear the full responsibility for taking the person who (allegedly) 
made a victim of him or her to court. As Carleton Allen said in a passage quoted 
above, 'the suppression of injurious wrongdoing must be ... controlled by some 
public authority more powerful and less erratic than the private plaintiff.'65 
Murder, rape, theft, and other paradigmatic crimes may have their private or 
65 Allen, 'The Nature of Crime' (above, n. 8), 234. 
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personal dimension, but they are nevertheless public wrongs that should be dealt 
with by the criminal law. 
There is an objection to this line of argument, however, that I must try to fore-
stall. According to this objection, to say that murder, rape, and theft are public 
wrongs that 'have their private or personal dimension' is to put things the wrong 
way. These offences are public wrongs because they are first and foremost wrongs 
done to individuals, whether we think of them as citizens or not. That is why, in 
Marshall's and Duff's terms, they are paradigmatic crimes. But this is a point that 
republicans can readily accept. As I understand it, the republican claim is not 
that murder only becomes a wrong when it is an offence against a member of a 
law-governed public. The claim, instead, is that murder is a public wrong because 
it is better to live in a society under the rule oflaw than to live in something like 
a state of nature or a society governed by norms of private vengeance, such as the 
vendetta. Murder and the other paradigmatic crimes are not the only or perhaps 
even the clearest cases of public wrongs-tax evasion and other attempts to free 
ride on the provision of public goods may provide those-but they are wrongs 
that we should want the public rather than private individuals to address. 
In reaching these conclusions about defamation, murder, and other offences, 
I have not appealed to community values or broadly communitarian considera-
tions. I have appealed, however, to republican considerations. If my arguments 
are persuasive, it is because republicanism provides the underpinnings of the 
conviction that crime is a public wrong. 
V. Conclusion 
What remains is to indicate, briefly, how a republican theory of criminal law 
draws on elements of the three neo-republican approaches considered in 
section III of this chapter. Taking them in the order of that discussion, Pettit's 
(and Braithwaite's) emphasis on dominion-especially on protecting the person, 
province, and property of the individual-helps to explain why assaults on the 
person are also assaults on the citizen. Huigens' emphasis on virtue-especially 
virtue understood as the exercise of practical reason-complements Pettit's 
approach by helping to explain why some offences, such as defamation, are better 
left to the civil than to the criminal law. And Marshall's and Duff's emphasis on 
crimes as 'shared wrongs' helps to explain the public stake in preserving some 
sense of community or solidarity where the law is concerned. 
I have argued that Marshall's and Duff's reliance on the sense of community 
leaves them in an awkward position, as they must find some way of discriminat-
ing between the values of acceptable and unacceptable communities. I have also 
argued that a straightforward appeal to republicanism avoids this problem, as 
republicanism involves a concern for citizens who govern themselves through the 
rule oflaw. There will still be some variation among republics, however, if not as 
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much as there is among communities simpliciter. What is expected of the citizen 
in one republic need not be exactly the same as it is in another; and the law need 
not rule in exactly the same way in every republic. Republicanism may explain 
why crime must be a matter of public rather than private law, with such offences 
as murder, rape, and theft included in the former category. It will not provide us, 
though, with an immutable and exhaustive list of offences, every one of them 
neatly classified as falling under the criminal law, the civil law, or outside the law 
altogether. There will always be difficult cases, and new kinds of cases arising 
as circumstances change, and the self-governing citizens of each republic will 
have to decide what wrongs shall be shared wrongs, or crimes. In this respect, 
Marshall's and Duff's approach represents an indispensable aspect of a republican 
theory of criminal law. 
